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BRIBERY AND INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION – THE 
ROLE OF MANDATORY RULES AND 
PUBLIC POLICY 
Vladimir Pavić* 
Although designed to resolve private disputes, usually commercial in nature, arbitration may 
nevertheless encounter during its course allegations of impropriety and criminal behaviour. In the 
context of international commercial arbitration, the most common of those are allegations of 
bribery. However, tribunals may adjudicate only matters of private law and, should they establish 
existence of bribery, may draw only civil law consequences thereof. An additional problem in this 
respect is determining the body of rules that will be applicable in defining the very notion of 
bribery, since some aspects of bribery are almost universally prohibited, while the others are 
banned only in certain jurisdictions. In determining the law applicable to the matters of bribery, 
tribunals then face choice-of-law dilemmas. Each of the public policy techniques (overriding 
mandatory provisions, international and/or transnational) has its strengths and weaknesses.  
I INTRODUCTION 
If one were to judge only by the recent proliferation of articles and studies on the appearance of 
issues of corruption (bribery in particular) before arbitration tribunals, one would be tempted to 
conclude that international commercial arbitration attracts the crooked and wicked more often than 
not, and does so at an increasing rate. That, of course, would be a hasty and unwise conclusion. 
International commercial arbitration cannot be dissociated from commercial reality where some 
people, even in the best of times, are ready to resort to the worst of means. The service of dispute 
resolution, just like any other service, is open to everyone who wants it and is able to afford it. 
Consumers of arbitration services are, therefore, a relatively neutral sample of the overall 
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commercial sphere, and are not, in themselves, particularly inclined towards illegal methods of 
doing business.  
Instead, the increase in the number of scholarly and other studies on issues of corruption in 
arbitration is probably due to a combination of factors. First, it is to be expected that the service 
providers (arbitration practitioners) start paying attention to the sort of customers they attract and 
start thinking about the best ways in which (not) to deal with some of them. Corruption is a fact of 
life (and in some countries a common one), so one has to prepare for the cases that might end up 
before him or her. Second, the business and legal community has become increasingly sensitive 
towards corruptive practices. This is not only reflected in the intensified legislative action aimed at 
combating corruption and other fraudulent acts and practices, but also in the rise of the so-called 
"anti-corruption industry".1 As the business of fighting corruption matures, its proponents become 
more vocal and its goals and methods better articulated. Finally, one has to admit that certain 
features of arbitration can potentially make arbitration attractive to the customers that we can all live 
without. Although the perception of secrecy is a myth, confidentiality of the proceedings is normally 
sufficient to strip the adjudicative process of the publicity traditionally associated with court 
proceedings. Thus, if the disputed deal was not of a pristine nature, opting for arbitration might offer 
additional comfort to the parties. However, as will be shown in this article, arbitration is anything 
but a safe harbour for such actors. 
What are the additional challenges posed by issues of corruption and the like in international 
commercial arbitration? Some of those challenges appear because corruption is contrary to the 
public policy and mandatory norms of – depending on the definition of bribery – many or all 
jurisdictions. Others are the result of an intersection between criminal and private law and the 
difficulties that sometimes arise when one has to deal with private law consequences before the 
criminal judge has had his or her say (for example, the issue of the standard of proof, which has 
been elaborated in detail by many authors).2 This article will try to focus predominantly on the 
  
1 The emergence of an "anti-corruption industry" is reflected in the rise of international governmental and 
non-governmental organisations aimed at fighting corruption, such as the Global Compact and the Group of 
States against Corruption within the Council of Europe, Transparency International, the Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative endorsed by the World Bank Group, and the United Nations Convention 
against Corruption Coalition (an advocacy group pressing for stricter adherence to the United Nations 
Convention against Corruption 2349 UNTS 41 (opened for signature 9 December 2003, entered into force 
14 December 2005) [UNCAC]. 
2 See generally Florian Haugeneder and Christoph Liebscher "Corruption and Investment Arbitration: 
Substantive Standards and Proof" in Christian Klausegger and others (eds) Austrian Arbitration Yearbook 
(CH Beck, Stämpfli & Manz, Vienna, 2009) 539; Phillip Landolt "Arbitrators' Initiatives to Obtain Factual 
and Legal Evidence" (2012) 28 Arb Intl 173; Michael Hwang and Kevin Lim "Corruption in Arbitration—
Law and Reality" (2012) 8 AIAJ 1; and Jeffrey Waincymer Procedure and Evidence in International 
Arbitration (Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 2012) at 743–824. 
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former set of issues, that is, those stemming from the public policy and mandatory characters of the 
rules that prohibit corruption. 
II THE NOTION OF BRIBERY 
The very notion of "bribery" (and "corruption") in international trade seems to provoke an 
almost unison condemnation. Legal commentators and judges alike have been resolute in labelling it 
as a vile, repugnant behaviour that tears the very fabric of society and the cross-border exchange of 
goods and services.3 One tribunal noted that bribery is a crime "more odious than theft" and that 
some jurisdictions rank it next to high treason.4 Yet, what is understood to represent "corruption" 
and "bribery" differs to a significant extent between jurisdictions. This deceptive failure to use 
consistent labelling across jurisdictions is familiar to European arbitration practitioners who follow 
American jurisprudence in arbitral matters (and vice versa). In any event, different understandings 
of what constitutes corruption and bribery in the context of international trade necessitates further 
examination. 
A good starting point is a definition offered by Abdulhay Sayed in perhaps the most voluminous 
take on the issue of corruption in arbitration, published almost two decades ago: acts of corruption 
in international trade are "actions of transfer of money or anything of value to foreign public 
officials, either directly or indirectly, to obtain favorable public decisions in the course of 
international trade".5 This definition is in tune with what appears to be a broad consensus – or at 
least the lowest common denominator – of what the notion of bribery is in international trade. 
However, to see the entire picture, one has to include other forms of potentially illicit behaviour.6 
The next step towards discovering what constitutes corruption and bribery in the context of 
international trade should be a legal analysis of the incrimination of bribery. Bribery amounts to the 
inducement of persons to act corruptly in the performance of their duties. Normally, those duties are 
of a public nature, discharged in the public interest. The United Nations Convention against 
Corruption (UNCAC)7 defines two main types of bribery. The first type is "public bribery", which 
consists of an intentional promise, offer, or a gift given to a domestic or foreign official, directly or 
  
3 See generally Abdulhay Sayed "La question de la corruption dans l'arbitrage commercial international: 
Inventaire des solutions" (2001) 19 ASA Bulletin 653; Hilmar Raeschke-Kessler and Dorothee Gottwald 
"Corruption" in Peter Muchlinski, Federico Ortino and Cristoph Schreuer (eds) The Oxford Handbook of 
International Investment Law (Oxford University Press, New York, 2008) 584 at 609; and Himpurna 
California Energy Ltd v PT (Persero) Persusahaan Listruik Negara (Final Award) (1999) 25 YBCA 13. 
4 World Duty Free Company Ltd v Kenya (Award) ICSID ARB/00/7, 31 August 2006 at [173]. 
5 Abdulhay Sayed Corruption in International Trade and Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer Law 
International, The Hague, 2004) at xxiii. 
6 Ibid. Sayed has limited his scope of study to public bribery only. 
7 UNCAC, above n 1. 
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indirectly, that provides an undue advantage (be it for the official himself or herself, or a third 
party), so that the official discharges his or her official duties in a certain way or refrains from doing 
so.8 On the side of the recipient, public bribery manifests itself in solicitation or acceptance of the 
kind of bribe defined above.9 The other main type of bribery is labelled as "private": here, the actors 
mimic the behaviour of the actors of public bribery – except that the recipient of the bribe is incited 
(or solicits the bribe) not to act in accordance with his or her private sector duties (that is, towards 
his or her employer or principal).10 
Generally speaking, public bribery is universally outlawed. The UNCAC has 163 State parties to 
it,11 and they have pledged that they "shall adopt" legislation that outlaws bribery of their own 
public officials, in both of its forms (offering or giving bribes and accepting them).12 In addition, the 
  
8 Article 15(a). 
9 Article 15(b). 
10 Article 21. See for example Bundesgesetz Gegen den Unlauteren Wettbewerb (Austria), §10 (translation: 
Federal Law Against Unfair Competition); Code pénal (Belgium), art 504bis, §1, [1] and [2]; Criminal Code 
RSC 1985 c C-46 (Canada), s 121; Criminal Code (Czech Republic), s 128b; Straffeloven (Denmark), s 299 
(translation: Criminal Code); Penal Code (Finland), ch 30, s 7; Strafgesetzbuch (Germany), s 299 
(translation: Criminal Code); Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (Greece), arts 7 and 8; a Büntető 
Törvénykönyvről (Hungary), s 253 (translation: Criminal Code); Penal Law (Israel), s 291; Il Codice Civile 
Italiano (Italy), s 2635 (translation: Italian Civil Code); Loi du 23 mai 2005, Journal Officiel (Luxembourg), 
A-n 74 at 1176, s 3 (translation: Law of 23 May 2005 on Bribery in the Private Sector); Wetboek van 
Strafrecht (the Netherlands), art 328ter (translation: Criminal Code), read jointly with Penal Code (the 
Netherlands), art 51; Secret Commissions Act 1910 (New Zealand), ss 3, 4 and 8; Lovom den almindelige 
borgerlige Straffelovs Ikrafttræden (Norway), ch 26, s 275 (translation: General Civil Penal Code), and 
Savings Bank Act (Norway), s 20; Kodeks karny (Poland), art 296a (translation: Criminal Code); DL 28-84 
com alterações regime em vigor em matéria de infracções antieconómicas e contra a saúde pública 
(Portugal), arts 41-B.1 and 41-C.1 (translation: Law number 28/84 of January 20: Changes the system in 
force in respect of offenses against uneconomic and public health); Trestný Zákon (Slovakia), ss 160 and 
161 (translation: Criminal Code); Criminal Code 2007 (Slovenia), arts 245–248; Brottsbalken (Sweden), s 
2, ch 20 (translation: Penal Code); Code pénal (Switzerland), art 158; Bribery Act 2010 (UK), ss 1–3.  
All the data on national laws and relevant subsections and paragraphs of the named statutes or codes was 
taken from the information provided by respective national authorities of the States parties to the UNCAC 
available at the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime portal "Legal Library" (2011) TRACK 
<www.track.unodc.org>. 
11 For the status of the UNCAC see United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime "United Nations Convention 
against Corruption" (2012) <www.unodc.org>. 
12 UNCAC, above n 1, at art 15. The list of States that effectively outlawed public bribery pursuant to the 
obligations under art 15 of the UNCAC comprises of the following:  
Europe and Asia region: Albania, Angola, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, 
Belgium, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Cambodia, China, Croatia, 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Gibraltar, Greece, Guernsey, Hong 
Kong, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jersey, Jordan, Kazakhstan, 
Korea, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao, Lebanon, Lichtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Maldives, 
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State parties have made further pledges when it comes to bribery of foreign public officials. 
However, the pledges in this matter have not been of uniform firmness: while all State parties 
promised that they will outlaw promising or giving bribes to foreign officials, they have only 
undertaken to "consider" outlawing solicitation or acceptance of bribes by foreign public officials.13 
  
Malta, Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Myanmar, Nepal, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, 
Palau, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, Timor Leste, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, Uzbekistan, 
Vietnam and Yemen. 
North, Central and South America and the Caribbean: Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, 
Barbados, Bermuda, Belize, Bolivia, British Virgin Islands, Canada, Cayman Islands, Chile, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Fiji, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, 
Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, United 
States of America and Venezuela.  
Africa, Australia and New Zealand: Afghanistan, Algeria, Australia, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, 
Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Comoros, Congo-Brazzaville, Cook Islands, 
Cote d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Guinea, Guinea-
Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, 
Mozambique, Namibia, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Vanuatu, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe.  
All the data on States incriminating public bribery under art 15 of the UNCAC has been compiled from the 
information available at the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime portal "Legal Library", above n 10. 
13 UNCAC, above n 1, at art 16(2). In this respect only a smaller number of State parties to the UNCAC 
implemented the solicitation/acceptance of bribes provisions. See for instance: Strafgesetzbuch (Austria), § 
307 (translation: Austrian Penal Code); Criminal Code Act 1995 (Australia, Cth), s 70.2; Code pénal 
(Belgium), above n 10, at art 250; Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act SC 1998 c 34 (Canada), s 3; 
Straffeloven (Denmark), above n 10, at s 122; Code penal (France), ss 435-1, 435-2 and 435-3; 
Strafgesetzbuch (Germany), above n 10, at s 334, and Gesetz zu dem Übereinkommen vom 17 Dezember 
1997 über die Bekämpfung der Bestechung ausländischer Amtsträger im internationalen Geschäftsverkehr 
(Germany), ss 1–4 (translation: Law to the Convention of 17 December 1997 on Combating Bribery of 
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions); Law 2803/2000 on the protection of the 
financial interests of European Communities (Greece), arts 2 and 3, Law 2802/2000 ratifying the EU 
Convention against Corruption of officials (Greece), art 4, and Law 2656/2000 (Greece), arts 2 and 3; a 
Büntető Törvénykönyvről (Hungary), above n 10, at ss 258B, 258C and 258D; Prevention of Corruption 
Act 1916 (Ireland), art 1 (as amended by the Prevention of Corruption Act 2001, art 2), and the Criminal 
Justice (Theft and Fraud Offences) Act 2001 (Ireland), art 44; Unfair Competition Prevention Law (Japan), 
arts 11(1), 11(2), 14 and 15; Código Penal Federal (Mexico), art 222bis; Wetboek van Strafrecht (the 
Netherlands), above n 10, at arts 178a and 364a; Crimes Act 1961 (New Zealand), s 105(c); Criminal Code 
of the Kingdom of Norway (Norway), ch 12, s 127; Kodeks karny (Poland), above n 10, at arts 228 and 229; 
Lei 34/87 com alterações Crimes de Responsabilidade dos Titulares de Cargos Políticos (Portugal), arts 16 
and 17 (translation: Law 34/87 of 16 July regulating the crimes of responsibility of political appointees); 
Trestný Zákon (Slovakia), above n 10, at ss 160b and 160c; Criminal Code 2007 (Slovenia), above n 10, at 
art 267; Código Penal (Spain), art 445; Brottsbalken (Sweden), above n 10, at s 2, ch 20; Code pénal 
(Switzerland), above n 10, at art 322 septies, [2]; Bribery Act 2010 (UK), above n 10, at s 6, and Anti-
666 (2012) 43 VUWLR 
This difference in attitude is worth noting, although it can be at least partly attributed to a preference 
for more conservative facets of territorial bases of jurisdiction in criminal matters (that is, subjective 
and objective territoriality). 
Public and private bribery are not the only forms of corruption in international trade that are 
outlawed. There are two further arrangements of importance. The first one, known as "trading in 
influence", takes place where someone trades the abuse of his or her real or supposed influence over 
public bodies or officials. This not only includes offering or giving bribes in exchange for such real 
or supposed influence, but also the solicitation or acceptance of bribes in exchange for a promise to 
influence the decision-making of State bodies and officials so that "undue advantage" is obtained.14 
The prohibition of this practice is not uniform, and this is reflected in the text of the UNCAC, where 
the signatories promised only to "consider" incriminating such behaviour.15 The second 
arrangement relates to so-called "facilitation payments", used to "grease" and expedite an action that 
a government or its officials would be obliged to perform in any event. Whilst some international 
documents and State laws expressly prohibit such payments, others permit them under certain 
circumstances.16 
  
terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (UK), s 108; Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 
(United States) 18 USC §1962 and §1963. 
All the data on national laws and relevant subsections and paragraphs of the named statutes or codes was 
taken from the information provided by respective national authorities of the States parties to the UNCAC 
available at the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime portal "Legal Library", above n 10. 
14 UNCAC, above n 1, at art 18(a). 
15 Article 18. 
16 It is interesting to note that within the OECD framework, a majority of the States have decided to 
incriminate "facilitating payments" (the list includes Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, 
Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Slovenia, Sweden, Turkey, and 
the United Kingdom); while a smaller number of States has decided on excluding facilitating payments from 
the scope of their definitions of outlawed, bribery-like behaviour. This group of States includes Australia, 
Austria, Canada, Greece, South Korea, New Zealand, Slovak Republic, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland 
and the United States. See the research and post by Andy Spalding, Assistant Professor at the University of 
Richmond School of Law, at Andy Spalding "Facilitating Payments (De)mystified (Part II)" (13 June 2012) 
The FCPA Blog <www.fcpablog.com/blog>. Some authorities, such as the Serious Fraud Office in the 
United Kingdom, wanted to make sure that the official stance towards "facilitation payments" amounts to 
zero tolerance, as noted by Chief Investigator Keith McCarty. A copy of the Serious Fraud Office's report is 
available at Bryan Cave "Enforcement of the UK Bribery Act – Facilitation Payments" (10 October 2011) 
<www.bryancave.com/files/Publication>. However, even for the States that have accepted "facilitation 
payments" as non-criminalised behaviour (such as Australia), the scrutiny of the United Nations and the 
general perception of the global community might shift their stance on the point. As noted in the report of 
the UNCAC Implementation Review Group, which reviewed Australia's compliance with the UNCAC, 
from late June 2012, "Australia should consider continuing to review its policies and approach on 
facilitation payments in order to effectively combat the phenomenon": Review of implementation of the 
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As this brief outline shows, a working definition of what constitutes "bribery" in international 
trade is difficult to delineate. While there is a consensus on the very core policy (when it comes to 
public bribery), the support for outlawing other arrangements (private bribery, peddling of 
influence, facilitation payments) is not nearly as solid. For the purposes of this article, all four 
modalities will be taken into consideration, as it is the differences between them and the different 
attitudes toward them that present the most acute challenges for international commercial 
arbitration. 
III TYPICAL SCENARIOS – THE APPEARANCE OF BRIBERY 
There are a myriad of ways in which criminal elements might appear within a dispute that is to 
be resolved by arbitration, or that has already been resolved by it. The sheer number of possible 
scenarios falls outside of the scope of this article, but some will be mentioned. The least likely is the 
criminal conduct of the arbitrators themselves: for example, if they become involved in a brawl, 
demand and accept bribes, or otherwise engage in criminal activities in the course of the arbitration. 
Somewhat less rare are the fraudulent and criminal acts of other actors during the course of the 
proceedings: false testimony, forged documents, unlawful surveillance of the parties and the 
arbitrators, and so on. Somewhat more often, illegality is not intrinsic to the proceedings, but has 
instead taken place at some prior time and is invoked during the proceedings by one of the parties. 
This article will examine the consequences of a variant of the latter scenario listed above – the 
one in which during the course of proceedings, it is alleged (or becomes apparent) that at some prior 
time one of the parties (or both) has resorted to bribery. The most common scenario involves 
contracts where the agent (intermediary) undertakes to assist its principal in obtaining a certain 
contract or permission.17 The contract is obtained, but the principal refuses to pay the agents a 
"reward" or "commission" and the matter is brought before arbitration. Defaulting respondents then 
often go on to argue that the contract of agency was a vehicle for bribery and that to pay 
remuneration to the agent would amount to reimbursement for the bribes paid to the officials who 
have awarded the contract.18 
  
United Nations Convention against Corruption: Executive Summary CAC/COSP/IRG/I/2/1 (2012) at 3. 
Accordingly, it comes as no surprise that this issue is currently under review by the Australian authorities – 
see Australian Government Attorney-General's Department "National Anti-Corruption Plan" (16 January 
2012) <www.ag.gov.au/anticorruptionplan>. 
17 See for example Broker v Contractor (Final Award) (1988) 19 YBCA 105; Consultant (Liechtenstein) v 
Contractor (Germany) (Final Award) (1994) 24a YBCA 71; Company S v Company F (Final Award) 
(1998) 4 J Droit Intl 1076; State-Owned Corporation X v Corporation Y (Final Award) (2003) 33 YBCA 
24; Consultant v German Company (2005) 31 YBCA 685; Thales v Y & Z Swiss Federal Tribunal 
4A.596/2008, 6 October 2009. 
18 According to one estimation, "systemic corruption can add 20–25% to the costs of government 
procurement, and frequently results in inferior quality goods and services and unnecessary purchases": 
Transparency International "Public Contracting" <http://archive.transparency.org>. Highlights to the 2005 
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When bribery issues – such as those laid out in the "agency/intermediary" scenario above – arise 
before an arbitration tribunal, they in turn trigger a number of legal questions, including: 
 whether the tribunal is allowed to adjudicate (hear) the matters tainted by bribery; 
 whether the arbitrators can investigate sua sponte and whether they are obliged to report 
their suspicions or findings to the authorities; 
 what the appropriate standard of proof is; 
 what the law applicable to private law consequences of bribery is, and how a particular rule 
will affect the outcome of the dispute; and 
 whether and how the issue of bribery can potentially be revisited before the State courts in 
proceedings for the setting aside, or recognition and enforcement, of the arbitral award. 
As has been mentioned, bribery and corruption cause particularly strong opprobrium since they 
are perceived to be contrary to the core values of most legal systems. In other words, prohibition of 
bribery is a matter of public policy and the mandatory rules of nation States. This article will limit 
its overview of bribery issues in arbitration to those that might cause particular problems precisely 
because of the overlapping layers of the norms comprising overriding mandatory provisions, 
national and international public policy. Thus, it will concentrate on the potential investigative and 
reporting role of the arbitral tribunal, the choice of law and rules applicable to the issue of bribery, 
the outcome of such choice and the standard of review by the courts. 
The other two issues (jurisdiction and the standard of proof), which will be left out of the scope 
of this work, have, in the course of the past few decades, suffered completely different fates. 
Nowadays it is considered a settled issue that arbitrators have jurisdiction to hear a dispute even if it 
involves bribery allegations. Whether they will deem the claim admissible, though, is another 
matter. In any event, the principle of separability will on most occasions be more than sufficient to 
shield the jurisdiction of the tribunal from the "it's about bribery!" torpedo allegations.19 When it 
comes to the issue of standard of proof, however, no clear consensus emerges: one can find a 
plethora of reasoned positions why those alleging bribery have to meet a "high" standard, one of 
"balance of probabilities", or why, once the allegation is made, the burden should be reversed and 
shifted to the alleged perpetrator to disprove.20 This divergence of potentially appropriate standards 
  
Transparency International Report delineate that pursuant to surveys conducted and reported, corruption is 
repeatedly greater in construction than in any other sector of the economy: Transparency International 
"Global Corruption Report 2005" (press release, 16 March 2005) at Highlights. 
19 The principle of separability entails that the validity of the main contract and the arbitration clause will be 
examined separately. Thus, a finding that the main contract is invalid will not automatically result in finding 
that the arbitration clause is invalid as well.  
20 For a comprehensive overview of the matter, see Stephan Wilske and Todd J Fox "Corruption in 
International Arbitration and Problems with Standard of Proof: Baseless Allegations or Prima Facie 
Evidence?" in Stefan Michael Kröll and others (eds) International Arbitration and International 
Commercial Law: Synergy, Convergence and Evolution (Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 2011) 489. 
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sometimes allows the tribunals to make up their minds and justify their decisions by applying a 
standard of proof that validates their findings.   
IV ARBITRATORS AS "GLOBOCOPS" – SUA SPONTE 
INVESTIGATION AND REPORTING TO THE AUTHORITIES? 
A typical scenario of introducing allegations of bribery in international commercial arbitration 
usually involves allegations of bribery being invoked by one of the parties. However, this is not 
necessarily always so, and the arbitrators might be presented with a somewhat different scenario, 
one in which the parties carefully "dance around" the issue of bribery.21 Defaulting respondents 
could, for instance, claim that they have obtained a contract solely through their own efforts (that is, 
that the claimant did nothing to help). As a first line of defence this approach might serve a valid 
purpose, especially as it avoids the risk of presenting one's own business as "ready to use bribery for 
convenience, but not ready to foot its bill". Should arbitrators observe such an exchange of 
arguments, or similarly, equally suspicious exchanges, without digging deeper and asking the parties 
to provide more facts about the true nature of the underlying contract? In other words, are arbitrators 
able to investigate possible bribery sua sponte, or are they limited to the evidence the parties present 
without any further investigation?  
The answer to this is influenced by several considerations. 
On the one hand, arbitration performs a judicial function.22 The goal of the arbitral process is to 
reach a decision, and the State provides such a decision with standing equal to that of a final 
judgment of a State court. In that respect, arbitration appears as a sort of private supplement to the 
judiciary,23 and one may reasonably expect that, in return for its decisions being on par with those 
of State courts, the State and the private parties can rightfully expect that an arbitration approaches 
matters of public policy and special mandatory norms (that is, bribery) with the same level of 
  
21 The least likely scenario – the one in which both parties admit that bribery was contemplated or has taken 
place – seldom occurs. But see World Duty Free Company Ltd v Kenya, above n 4; and Argentine Engineer 
v British Company (Final Award) (1963) 21 YBCA 47. 
22 Antoine Pillet Traité pratique de droit international privé (Tenin, Paris, 1924) at 537 (translation: Practical 
Treatise on Private International Law); Henri Motulsky Écrits: Études et notes sur l'arbitrage (Dalloz, 
Paris, 1974) at 46 (translation: Writings: Studies and notes on arbitration); FA Mann "Lex Facit Arbitrum" 
(1986) 2 Arb Intl 241; M Mustill "Transnational Arbitration in English Law" (1984) 37 CLP 133 at 133–
142; Philippe Fouchard and others On International Commercial Arbitration (2nd ed, Kluwer Law 
International, The Hague, 1999) at 10. 
23 But not a part of it. When the judiciary contends otherwise – like in the decision of the Croatian 
Constitutional Court U-III-669/2003, NN 157/04, 27 October 2004 – it is usually met with stark opposition 
by commentators: see Sinisa Triva "Arbitration and Public Policy: Constitutional Complaint as Means for 
Setting Aside Arbitral Award" (2000) 7 Croat Arb Yrbk 115; MA Giunio "Ugovor o arbitraži u praksi 
Ustavnog suda RH" (2005) 2 Pravo u gospodarstvu 56 at 59–67; and D Babić "Ustavna tužba protiv odluke 
arbitražnog suda o nenadležnosti" (2005) 7 Pravo i porezi 22 at 23–24. 
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attentiveness as would be the case with the State judiciary. On the other hand, arbitration is a 
creature of contract. The will of the parties is indispensible – arbitrators are supposed to serve this 
will and not impose their own opinions contrary to the parties' determination.24 
Further, the imperative to protect "public policy" (or apply the mandatory rules of a particular 
jurisdiction) arises only if the tribunal finds that public policy (national, international, transnational) 
against the suspected behaviour exists, and that such rules are – because of their international or 
transnational character, or because of their will to be applied (Anwendungswille), or because of the 
location of the arbitral seat – supposed to be applied. In other words, the duty to act on suspicion 
would potentially arise only if the suspected bribery is prohibited by the applicable rules. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, a tribunal could act upon the imperative to investigate a 
suspected and prohibited bribery only if such sua sponte inquiry would neither fall outside the 
general prerogatives of the tribunal, nor endanger the basic pillars of fair proceedings. It seems that 
such action could hardly qualify as "exceeding its mandate" under art V(1)c of the New York 
Convention25 or art 34(2)(a)(iii) of the Model Law.26 On the contrary, failure to act sua sponte may 
produce a decision that inadvertently endorses bribery and opens the resulting award to annulment 
or non-recognition.27 
Therefore, arbitrators can and should investigate suspected or manifest illegality sua sponte, 
whenever the suspected or manifest illegality is relevant for the final decision on claims brought 
  
24 For more on so-called "contractualist" views of arbitration see  rédéric- douard  lein Considérations sur 
l'arbitrage en droit international privé:                                                         
                                      (Helbing & Lichtenhahn, Basel, 1955) (translation: Considerations 
on Arbitration in Private International Law: Preceded on a study of Legislation, Doctrine and 
Jurisprudence on the Matter); Morris Stone "A Paradox in the Theory of Commercial Arbitration" (1966) 
21 Arb J 156 at 182; Julian DM Lew, Loukas A Mistelis and Stefan Kröll Comparative International 
Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 2003) at 78. 
25 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 330 UNTS 3 (opened for 
signature 10 June 1958, entered into force 7 June 1959) [New York Convention]. 
26 Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration of the United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law GA Res 40/72, A/Res/40/72 (1985) [Model Law]. 
27 Hwang and Lim, above n 2, at 10; RH Kreindler "Aspects of Illegality in the Formation and Performance of 
Contracts" (2006) 3 TDM 209 at 253. 
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before them.28 When they do so, the parties are also able to comment and respond to suspicions of 
illegality.29 
The second question is whether the arbitrators should, once they become sufficiently persuaded 
by the facts presented or inferred from the record, report their suspicions to the authorities. If the 
bribery is of the sort that is universally proscribed, should it, as a rule, be reported in order to help 
combat what is viewed as a menace of global proportions? The chances of bribery being reported 
might depend on two factors. The first is the consideration of confidentiality of arbitral proceedings. 
The second is the scope and stringency of the reporting duties imposed by relevant jurisdictions.  
Confidentiality is often cited as one of the most important advantages of international 
commercial arbitration, although a closer examination reveals that its reach is somewhat limited. 
Parties normally expect their arbitral affairs not to reach the general public – national laws generally 
treat such an attitude benevolently – and arbitrators are happy to collect an extra premium for the 
confidentiality of their services. The obligation of confidentiality is sometimes express,30 more 
often implied,31 and if applicable to the parties it is generally understood to extend to the tribunal 
  
28 RH Kreindler "Is the Arbitrator Obligated to Denounce Money Laundering, Corruption of Officials, etc.? 
The Arbitrator as Accomplice – Sham Proceedings and the Trap of the Consent Award" in Theodore H 
Moran Combating Corrupt Payments in Foreign Investment Concessions: Closing the Loopholes, Extending 
the Tools (Center for Global Development, Washington DC, 2008) 26. 
29 BM Cremades and DJ Cairns "Transnational public policy in international arbitral decision-making" in 
Kristine Karsten and Andrew Berkeley (eds) Arbitration: Money Laundering, Corruption and Fraud (ICC 
Publishing, Paris, 2003) 65 at 83. 
30 Gary B Born International Arbitration: Cases and Materials (Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 2011) 
at 791–792. 
31 See in that sense Oxford Shipping Co Ltd v Nippon Yusen Kaisha [1984] 3 All ER 835 (QB) at 842:  
The concept of private arbitration derives simply from the fact that the parties have agreed to 
submit to arbitration particular disputes arising between them and only between them. It is 
implicit in this that strangers shall be excluded from the hearing and conduct of the arbitration 
and that neither the tribunal nor any of the parties can insist that the dispute shall be heard or 
determined concurrently with or even in consonance with another dispute, however convenient 
that course may be to the party seeking it and however closely associated [with each other] the 
disputes in question may be. 
Dolling-Baker v Merrett [1990] 1 WLR 1205 (CA) at 1213:  
As between parties to an arbitration … their very nature is such that there must … be some 
implied obligation on both parties not to disclose or use for any other purpose any documents 
prepared for and used in the arbitration, or disclosed or produced in the course of the 
arbitration, or transcripts or notes of the evidence in the arbitration or the award, and indeed not 
to disclose in any other way what evidence had been given by any witness in the arbitration, 
save with the consent of the other party, or pursuant to an order or leave of the court. 
In Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Plowman [1995] 183 CLR 10 at 48, the Australian High Court concluded 
that the exclusion of the public from arbitration hearings would be rendered meaningless if the parties to the 
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too.32 The intensity of protection varies – generally, it is stronger when it comes to proper arbitral 
proceedings, but views differ greatly on what it is that is actually protected. Some hold that 
documents already existing independently of arbitration – even if later presented before it – are not 
confidential, while those created during the course of arbitration and solely for the purpose of 
arbitration (records, rulings, awards, testimonials) are confidential.33 
In any event, the obligation of confidentiality exists in order to protect private, and not public, 
interests. By contrast, the obligation to report crime is established in order to protect public interest, 
and as such will trump obligations of confidentiality whenever the members of the tribunal are 
subject to such a duty. Where there is no legislative duty of confidentiality, the only consideration is 
how strong and compelling the rules are establishing the duty to report. Where a statutory obligation 
of confidentiality exists, the legislators have usually carved out a pretty flexible public interest 
exception within the law.34 In turn, this again means that the existence of a duty to report will 
depend on the strength of the coercion to do so. 
It is necessary to stress that legal systems usually impose a sanctionless duty (sometimes 
referred to as "a duty and a right") to report a crime.35 However, if the crime is of a certain 
magnitude (usually those prosecuted ex offo, and not proprio motu), failure to report becomes a 
crime in itself, unless one enjoys a statutory exception.36 In addition, public officials and those 
entrusted with performing public competencies, or those exercising particular responsibilities in 
  
proceedings would be allowed to make the content of the hearings public through television, press or 
otherwise. 
32 Michael Hwang and Katie Chung "Protecting Confidentiality and its Exceptions – The Way Forward?" in 
ICC Confidentiality in Arbitration: Commentaries on Rules, Statutes, Case Law and Practice (ICC 
Publishing, Paris, 2009) 40. 
33 Dolling-Baker v Merrett, above n 31; Hassneh Insurance Co of Israel v Steuart J Mew [1993] 2 Lloyd's Rep 
243 (QB). 
34 See for example in Australia (International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth), s 23G(1), taking into account 
amendments up to 2011); New Zealand (Arbitration Act 1996, s 14E(2), reprinted as at 1 January 2011); 
Scotland (Scottish Arbitration Rules, r 26(1), yet to be implemented). See also generally Ileana M 
Smeureanu Confidentiality in International Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 
2011) at 16–17 and 20–22. 
35 See for example the Criminal Procedure Code of the Republic of Serbia, art 280(1). 
36 For example, the Criminal Code of the Republic of Serbia, art 331(1) provides that one is obliged, under 
threat of fine or imprisonment, to report the preparation of crimes for which a prison sentence of more than 
five years might be handed down. Even if a law provides for a sanction in the case of failure to report a 
crime – such as Crimes and Criminal Procedure 18 USC, pt 1, ch 1, § 4, which incriminates "misprision of 
felony" and states that anyone who has a knowledge of crime and fails to report that crime may be fined, 
imprisoned for up to three years or both – these provisions are rarely applied. For a detailed analysis of this 
problem, see Sandra Guerra Tompson "The White-Collar Police Force: 'Duty to Report' Statutes in Criminal 
Theory" (2002) 11 Wm & Mary Bill Rts J 3. 
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juridical persons, are sometimes put under a stricter obligation to report crimes.37 Therefore, even if 
one puts aside the question of "which law applies?" one has to decide whether the arbitrators, 
although deriving their jurisdiction from the agreement of the parties, also perform their judicial 
function by virtue of the generosity of the legislator. It is the legislator who has entrusted them with 
the performance of such competencies, otherwise reserved for State judiciaries. If they are viewed as 
performing publicly entrusted competencies, arbitrators might have to observe a potentially stricter 
standard of reporting.38 
Therefore, arbitrators are potentially subject to two types of duties to report bribery. One is 
moral and legal, but sanctionless (and proclaimed as such in law); the other is legal and backed by 
criminal sanctions. Although it is quite possible that obligations of the former kind might 
occasionally be observed, one should be forgiven for predicting that the arbitrators would in all 
likelihood pay more attention to obligations of the latter type, in order to avoid criminal punishment. 
If the threat of sanctions is their only motive, which norms (that is, norms of which jurisdictions) 
should they observe? It is difficult to provide a simple answer to such a question. The scope of 
application of criminal law rules is predominantly territorial. Nevertheless, many criminal codes 
provide protective, personal and universal principles in order to potentially expand the umbrella of 
their criminal legislation. This means that a failure to report a crime of bribery in accordance with a 
duty will most likely represent a crime of its own in the country where the bribe was given or 
accepted, and (given that some laws prohibit the bribing of foreign officials) in the country where 
the bribe-giver was based.39 If the country where the crime was committed is, at the same time, a 
  
37 Criminal Procedure Code of the Republic of Serbia, above n 35, at art 253(2); Criminal Code of the 
Republic of Serbia, ibid, at art 332(2); Criminal Procedure Code of the French Republic, art 40. 
38 Dragor Hiber and Vladimir Pavić "Arbitration and Crime" (2008) 25 J Int Arb 461 at 466 et seq; Hwang and 
Lim, above n 2, at 14–24.  
39 Cooperation in terms of reporting bribes is also enshrined within the UNCAC, above n 1, in the form of a 
recommendation for the State parties. Namely, art 39(2) provides that:  
Each State Party shall consider encouraging its nationals and other persons with a habitual 
residence in its territory to report to the national investigating and prosecuting authorities the 
commission of an offence established in accordance with this Convention. 
As noted within the Technical Guide to the United Nations Convention Against Corruption United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime (United Nations, New York, 2009) at 123–124, many corruption cases are 
complex and covert, and would not come to the attention of the relevant authorities – or their investigation 
would be impaired – without the cooperation of private sector entities, especially financial institutions, as 
well as private citizens. This is particularly important, as early notification by relevant private sector bodies 
or early cooperation with investigative agencies may be crucial to the identification and safeguarding of 
potential evidence and the initiation of inquiries pertaining to bribery cases. The Technical Guide underlines 
that legal persons or senior management and staff who either report to relevant law enforcement agencies, or 
cooperate with requests for information, should, where they have acted in good faith and on reasonable 
grounds, have the assurance of confidentiality and, where the allegations do not lead to an investigation, 
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country of the seat of the tribunal, a country of the arbitrator's domicile, or a country where the 
arbitrator expects to travel or do business, one might expect his or her compliance with the reporting 
rule to be more likely than in a case where the crime took place in a remote jurisdiction. However, 
commentators note that it is extremely difficult to identify a case where arbitrators have acted on 
their duty to report. There are several possible explanations for this. First, arbitrators are normally 
content to apply civil law sanctions to proven bribery, and their civil law disposition makes them 
reluctant to assume the role of "globocops" (or "globosnitches"). Second, in the international 
context, parties often choose a neutral country to be the seat of arbitration. In such case, arbitrators 
are less likely to feel the urge to check the content of the reporting obligations in relevant 
jurisdictions and observe them. Finally, in a portion of the cases where bribery was alleged or 
apparent, criminal complaints were already lodged prior to or during the arbitral proceedings by the 
party that had claimed the existence of bribery.40 
V THE RULES GOVERNING THE EXISTENCE AND CIVIL LAW 
CONSEQUENCES OF BRIBERY 
Applying criminal law provisions is often tough, especially when it comes to sentencing. In one 
respect, however, decision-making in a criminal law case is much easier than in a civil law dispute. 
When it comes to disputes involving a foreign (international) element, a civil judge typically 
engages in a conflict-of-law analysis. A criminal judge has no such problems. He can apply only one 
law – that of the country in whose name he is passing the judgment.41 
A national judge sitting on a civil law case has to follow the choice of legal doctrine as laid out 
in the law of his land: it is usually codified in national laws, but can also be contained in precedents. 
In cross-border matters, legislators normally allow the parties to choose the applicable law, even if 
the chosen law has no connection with the underlying relationship. This freedom is, however, 
constrained by two instruments: that of public policy and that of mandatory norms. 
When determining the proper law applicable to the contract, the public policy of the forum 
serves as a safety valve, preventing the application of any rules when the effect of their application 
would run contrary to the fundamental legal principles of the domestic legal order. The exact 
content of public policy (ordre public) in this context is usually left unclear. This elasticity and 
ambiguity serves a useful purpose, as long as it is scrupulously used.  
The other possible check on parties' choice of law or on otherwise applicable choice-of-law 
rules are mandatory norms; mandatory in the true international sense (lois d'application immediate, 
  
should be able to further enjoy protection from civil suits and claims for damages from those involved in the 
allegations.  
40 Or some other crime: see for example AJU v AJT [2011] SGCA 41, [2011] 4 SLR 739. 
41 Leaving aside criminal judges operating at an international level. 
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Eingriffsnormen).42 Applying mandatory norms, or taking them into consideration, is independent 
of the conflict analysis. In the context of private international law, those norms are usually derived 
from the laws that lay down the foundations of an economic system. However, criminal law norms 
can also be viewed as mandatory rules par excellence,43 albeit of a nature that allows a foreign judge 
only to take them into consideration, and not to apply them directly. 
While a conflict analysis by a State judge is relatively straightforward, those arbitrating a 
dispute of international character face a real smorgasbord of choice.44 Unconstrained by domestic 
conflict rules, they are usually instructed to apply the law chosen by the parties or, failing such 
choice, any rules they find appropriate (that is, most closely connected to the dispute). No traditional 
conflict methodology is normally required.  
This free pass has not resulted in decision-making by fiat. On the contrary, arbitration practice 
and jurisprudence have been careful to stress that the arbitrators have to observe public policy rules 
and mandatory norms and draw civil law consequences for violation of said norms.45 However, the 
nature of the arbitrators' mandate and their role as decision-makers who act outside of any judiciary 
entails a further dilemma: which public policy and which mandatory rules should they observe? In 
  
42 See for example European Parliament and European Council Regulation 593/2008 on the law applicable to 
contractual obligations [2008] OJ L177/6, art 9(3) [Rome I]; Jonathan Harris "Mandatory Rules and Public 
Policy under the Rome I Regulation" in Franco Ferrari and Stefan Leible (eds) Rome I Regulation: The Law 
Applicable to Contractual Obligations in Europe (Sellier, Munich, 2009) 269 at 310 et seq; James Fawcett, 
Janeen Carruthers and Peter North Cheshire, North & Fawcett: Private International Law (14th ed, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2008) at 738 et seq; Swiss Federal Code on Private International Law, art 19; 
Wolfgang Peter Arbitration and Renegotiation of International Investment Agreements (2nd ed, Kluwer 
Law International, The Hague, 1995) at 139; Inter-American Convention on the Law Applicable to 
International Contracts 33 ILM 732 (signed 17 March 1994, entered into force 15 December 1996), art 11; 
Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Agency 16 ILM 775 (signed 14 March 1978, entered into 
force 1 May 1992), art 16.  
43 Alexis Mourre "Arbitration and Criminal Law: Reflections on the Duties of the Arbitrator" (2006) 22 Arb 
Intl 95 at 99; Hiber and Pavić, above n 38, at 469.  
44 See for example Swiss Federal Code on Private International Law, above n 42, at art 187; Belgian Judicial 
Code, art 1700; Arbitration Act 1996 (UK), s 46; International Criminal Court Rules of Arbitration, art 21 
[ICC Rules of Arbitration]; American Arbitration Association Arbitration Rules, art 28 [AAA Arbitration 
Rules]; German Institute of Arbitration Rules, art 23 [DIS Rules]; United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law Arbitration Rules 1976, art 35 [UNCITRAL Rules]. 
45 Alexis Mourre "Arbitrability of Antitrust Law from the European and US perspectives" in Gordon Blanke 
and Phillip Landolt (eds) EU and US Antitrust Arbitration: A Handbook for Practitioners (Kluwer Law 
International, The Hague, 2011) 3 at 11: 
There is nowadays a general consensus that arbitrators have the powers to apply mandatory 
rules, either principally or incidentally, and to draw the civil consequences of a violation of 
said rules, under the control of the judge who will be called upon to assess the award's validity 
and/or enforceability. 
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matters of bribery, this translates into the following dilemma: which rules should be relevant and/or 
applicable to the issue of bribery if it is invoked in arbitration proceedings? As has been shown 
above, this dilemma is not moot, as the notion of bribery and the range of prohibited actions differs 
across jurisdictions. 
The starting point is, of course, the choice of law made by the parties.46 However, the parties 
cannot expect to choose a law that is lenient on some forms of bribery or purchase of influence and 
expect the tribunal to honour that choice in each and every case.47 So, which rules matter? 
First, irrespective of the law chosen by the parties, the tribunal might observe the mandatory 
rules of the country where the contract is to be performed. However, not every mandatory rule will 
be given equal treatment.48 Normally rules will be accorded a greater impact if they indeed try to 
protect a goal that looks legitimate and recognisable, although it need not be shared by other 
jurisdictions. Thus, a blanket prohibition of intermediaries contained in lex loci solutionis is unlikely 
to be enforced49 and will not have the same weight as, for instance, prohibition of private bribery, or 
purchase of influence. Applying sweeping prohibitions from the place of performance runs a risk of 
the award being set aside for being contrary to a much more permissive standard existing in an 
overwhelming number of jurisdictions. In other words, transnational attitudes towards agents and 
intermediaries (allowed as a matter of principle) would trump local or parochial prohibitions.50 
The second potential source of the overriding norms outside the proper law itself is the law of 
the seat. The "pressure" of the public policy and mandatory norms of the lex arbitri is something 
arbitrators are always fully aware of, since the courts of the place of the seat might be called on later 
to set the award aside. Yet the public policy and mandatory rules of the seat will not be 
automatically applied in each and every case. In order to qualify, there has to be a sufficient nexus 
between lex arbitri and the case; that is, the case has to touch upon local public interest in a manifest 
  
46 See for example Swiss Federal Code on Private International Law, above n 42, at art 187; Belgian Judicial 
Code, above n 44, at art 1700; Arbitration Act 1996 (UK), above n 44, at s 46; ICC Rules of Arbitration, 
above n 44, at art 21(1); AAA Arbitration Rules, above n 44, at art 28(1); DIS Rules, above n 44, at art 
23(1); UNCITRAL Rules, above n 44, at art 35(1). 
47 As it for instance did in an AAA arbitration decided between Northorp and Triad, where the tribunal chose 
to disregard a Saudi decree that prohibited payment of commissions to intermediaries. The award was 
eventually enforced: Northorp Corporation v Triad International Marketing 811 F 2d 1265 (9th Cir 1987). 
Similarly, the tribunal in Consultant (State Y) v State Agency (State Z) and State Owned Bank (State Z) 
(Final Award) (1994) 21 YBCA 79, found that it is only bound to apply mandatory rules of lex contractus. 
48 Naturally, a precondition is that the rule is truly mandatory. For instance a circular of the Kuwaiti Ministry 
of Defence was found not to possess such quality: F, U v W Inc (Final Judgment) [1995] ASA Bulletin 225. 
49 X Ltd (Great Britain) v YSA (France) (Award) [1988] ASA Bulletin 136; "Extracts from an ad hoc Award 
rendered in 1989 in Geneva" [1991] ASA Bulletin 239. 
50 Decision of the Swiss Supreme Court Hilmarton Ltd (UK) v Omnium de Traitementet de Valorisation – 
OTV (France) (1994) 20 YBCA 663. 
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and profound way.51 Further, in arbitral matters the concept of public policy of the seat is further 
constrained to "international public policy", in order to emphasise the sacrosanct nature of the rules 
that comprise it.52 Here, the "internationality" of public policy denotes its operation even in cases 
with a foreign element, and not its origin – its source and object of protection is still a national legal 
system. For instance, an English court labelled English policy against contracts of purchase of 
influence as "purely domestic", although the country of performance shared the same attitude 
towards such transactions.53 
There is one more potential source of legal rules before the arbitral tribunal that might interfere 
with the methodology of choosing applicable norms as described above. Namely, not being part of 
any judiciary, arbitration tribunals may resort to rules that have not been enacted by any given State. 
Arbitrators can in such cases rely on "transnational public policy".54 Unlike "international public 
policy", which is national in origin but international in its content, transnational public policy 
represents fundamental legal principles upon which there is a broad consensus in the international 
community.55 Transnational public policy may be used as a bar to enforcement of the contract, or as 
a tool to circumvent the application of an otherwise applicable law. When it comes to bribery, the 
convenience of this tool in international commercial arbitration is limited. As shown above, 
transnational public policy exists where there is a "broad consensus". Yet how is breadth measured – 
by the number of States, or by their relative economic and political importance? Is one allowed to 
distil a transnational policy from the collective attitudes of some more exclusive club (like the 
  
51 Compare Rome I, above n 42, at arts 9(2) and 21. 
52 As noted in Howard M Holtzmann "Commentary" in International Chamber of Commerce 60 Years of ICC 
Arbitration: A Look at the Future (ICC Publishing, Paris, 1984) 361 at 364: 
International public policy, according to a generally accepted doctrine, is confined to violation 
of really fundamental conceptions of legal order in the country concerned. 
Or, as put by Pierre Mayer "Effect of International Public Policy in International Arbitration?" in Loukas A 
Mistelis and Julian DM Lew (eds) Pervasive Problems in International Arbitration (Kluwer Law 
International, The Hague, 2006) 61 at 61, international public policy has two meanings: the concept of 
public policy as applied in international private law (as an obstacle to the application of foreign law or 
recognition of foreign judgments), or a part of the public policy that belongs to international law (UN 
embargoes and the like). 
53 In the end, the agreement was unenforceable because it was contrary to the public policy of the loci 
solutionis. English prohibition alone would have been insufficient. See Lemenda Trading Co Ltd v African 
Middle East Petroleum Co Ltd [1988] 1 QB 448 at 459. 
54 Pierre Lalive "Transnational (or Truly International) Public Policy and International Arbitration" in Pieter 
Sanders (ed) ICCA Congress Series No 3 (Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 1986) 257. 
55 See in that sense Resolution of the Institut de Droit International Equality of Treatment of the Law of the 
Forum and of Foreign Law Session of Santiago de Compostela (12 September 1989), art II(d), which reads: 
"It is recommended that the applicable foreign law shall only be set aside if its effects are manifestly 
contrary to public policy".  
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OECD)? States have different definitions of bribery and do not incriminate the same range of 
behaviour.  
There are two possible ways to approach the question of transnational public policy when it 
comes to bribery. One way is to find strength in numbers, which would mean that when support for 
incrimination of certain behaviour is overwhelming, such prohibition should be treated as one of 
transnational public policy. Prohibition of the bribery of public officials (prohibited in over 160 
countries) qualifies as such. However, when it comes to prohibition of private bribery, the numbers 
are not so conclusive: currently more than 90 countries in the world prohibit it, and it is incriminated 
in about two-thirds of the OECD jurisdictions (22 out of 34 countries).56 There would be even less 
support for finding that prohibitions of facilitation payments and purchases of influence amount to 
policy of transnational quality. The other approach in identifying transnational policy would be to 
look into the trends. This would take into account that the number of jurisdictions where private 
bribery is incriminated is growing57 and would inevitably amount to the equivalent of an "activist 
judge". Without doubt, this is where the arbitrators' subjective views will come into play.58 In any 
event, if the arbitrator is advised to use the "nuclear" option of "international public policy" only in 
extreme situations, such advice is even more appropriate when it comes to the invocation of 
"transnational public policy".   
  
56 As far as OECD countries are concerned, private bribery is incriminated in: Bundesgesetz Gegen den 
Unlauteren Wettbewerb (Austria), above n 10, at §10; Code pénal (Belgium), above n 10, at art 504bis, §1, 
[1] and [2]; Criminal Code (Canada), above n 10, at s 121; Criminal Code (Czech Republic), above n 10, at 
s 128b; Straffeloven (Denmark), above n 10, at s 299; Penal Code (Finland), above n 10, at ch 30, s 7; 
Strafgesetzbuch (Germany), above n 10, at s 299; Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (Greece), above 
n 10, at arts 7 and 8; a Büntető Törvénykönyvről (Hungary), above n 10, at s 253; Penal Law (Israel), above 
n 10, at s 291; Il Codice Civile Italiano (Italy), above n 10, at s 2635; Loi du 23 mai 2005 (Luxembourg), 
above n 10, at s 3; Wetboek van Strafrecht (the Netherlands), above n 10, at art 328ter, read jointly with 
Penal Code (the Netherlands), above n 10, at art 51; Secret Commissions Act 1910 (New Zealand), above n 
10, at ss 3, 4 and 8; Lovom den almindelige borgerlige Straffelovs Ikrafttræden (Norway), above n 10, at ch 
26, s 275; and Savings Bank Act (Norway), above n 10, at s 20; Kodeks karny (Poland), above n 10, at art 
296a; DL 28-84 com alterações regime em vigor em matéria de infracções antieconómicas e contra a saúde 
pública (Portugal), above n 10, at arts 41-B.1 and 41-C.1; Trestný Zákon (Slovakia), above n 10, at ss 160 
and 161; Criminal Code 2007 (Slovenia), arts 245–248; Brottsbalken (Sweden), above n 10, at s 2, ch 20; 
Code pénal (Switzerland), above n 10, at art 158; Bribery Act 2010 (UK), above n 10, at ss 1–3.  
57 Pursuant to the data submitted by the national authorities of the UNCAC member states, bribery in the 
private sector is currently incriminated in more than 90 jurisdictions worldwide – see data provided in 
relation to UNCAC, above n 1, at art 21, available at United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime portal 
"Legal Library", above n 10. 
58 Mayer in Mistelis and Lew, above n 52, at 69. 
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VI THE IMPACT OF THE FINDING OF BRIBERY ON THE FATE 
OF CONTRACTS 
As laid out in Part III above, typical scenarios in which bribery allegations are invoked in the 
context of international commercial arbitration are those involving intermediaries acting as a vehicle 
for funnelling bribes. On the basis of such bribes, the principal obtains some favour and, more often 
than not, obtains a contract from the target of the bribe (be it a company or a State). The arbitrator 
then usually faces the claim of the intermediary (for its "commission"), or the target of the bribe (for 
rescission, or adaptation of the contract procured by bribery). One can, of course, encounter 
alternative scenarios; for example, a "renegade" or simply overzealous agent who bribes the target 
not on the instruction (explicit or implicit) of the principal, but in order to make sure he or she gets 
his or her commission. In any event, if the arbitrators find that bribery indeed took place, they have 
to determine the civil law consequences of such a finding, in particular the fate of the underlying or 
resulting contracts. 
When it comes to the contracts directed at bribery (that is, those between the principal and the 
intermediary who serves as a go-between), the contracts' fate is not controversial. Although national 
laws differ on what is perceived as bribery, their treatment of what they actually label as bribery is 
uniform – contracts aimed at bribery are illegal and are therefore null and void. This civil law 
consequence is not only contained in the provisions of national laws59 and international 
conventions,60 but is also identified as a principle of transnational public policy.61 Therefore, no 
matter which set of rules a tribunal has resorted to (national or transnational) when examining the 
potential bribery, once it finds that, under the applicable rules, bribery indeed took place, the 
contract aimed at bribery will be held null and void. It should be noted that sometimes this 
consequence will follow even if the applicable law (that is, the chosen law or the law of the seat) 
  
59 See for example Schweizerisches Obligationenrecht (Switzerland), art 20 (translation: Swiss Law on 
Obligations); Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (Germany), §134 (translation: Civil Code); Law on Obligations 
(Serbia), arts 47 and 103; Civil Code of the Russian Federation (Russian Federation), art 169 in relation to 
art 167. 
60 Council of Europe Civil Law Convention on Corruption 174 ETS (opened for signature 4 November 1999, 
entered into force 1 November 2003), art 8(1) reads "[e]ach party shall provide in its internal law for any 
contract or clause of a contract providing for corruption to be null and void."  
61 See for example Centre of Transnational Law "No.IV.7.2(a) – Invalidity of contract due to bribery" 
TRANS-LEX.org <www.trans-lex.org>: 
Contracts based on or involving the payment or transfer of bribes ("corruption money", "secret 
commissions", "pots-de-vin", "kickbacks") are void (emphasis added). 
See also Olaf Meyer "The Formation of a Transnational Ordre Public against Corruption – Lessons for 
Arbitral Tribunals" (Paper presented at Global Challenges of International Sales Law Conference, 
University of Florida, Florida, 11–12 November 2011).  
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does not treat a particular conduct as bribery, since the sanction of nullity can follow from a contract 
the object of which is immoral, and consequently illegal.62 
Normally, a null and void contract gives rise to obligations for the actors to make restitution for 
what they have received pursuant to the void contract. However, when it comes to bribery, these 
obligations are curtailed by the principle nemo auditor turpitudinem suam allegans, which means 
that no restitution will be due.63 In some national laws, the courts are allowed to order parties in 
such cases to hand over what they have received in such a manner to the State or to a municipality,64 
or to allow partial restitution. The exercise of the former option does not appear to be at the disposal 
of an arbitral tribunal, as it introduces a penal element to civil proceedings.  
Unless the tribunal is empowered by law to order the partial restitution, the end result might be 
that one of the two parties (both of them unconscionable) walks away with a pot of gold or receives 
a windfall, a consequence of the application of the in pari delicto potior est conditio possidentis 
maxim.65 For instance, the intermediary will keep the advance for the bribe it has not used, or the 
principal would get what it wanted (the target contract or the favour) without reimbursing the 
intermediary for its "services", including the expenses for the bribe. This "no-honesty-no-equity" 
outcome would appear to favour the most dishonest party,66 the one who has outmaneuvered its 
counterpart.67 Some tribunals have expressed their unease when deciding to stick to the strict 
principle of no restitution.68 However, this threat of betrayal and the inequitable ending of affairs is 
a potent tool in the fight against corruption.69 Mutual trust is the main ingredient of the illegal 
scheme. For instance, cartels are highly dependent on mutual cooperation and trust, but there are, at 
the same time, powerful incentives for the members of the cartel to break their promises and free-
ride at the expense of others. This is why cartels are inherently unstable and this instability deters 
  
62 See for example Schweizerisches Obligationenrecht (Switzerland), above n 59, at art 20; Law on 
Obligations (Serbia), above n 59, at art 49; also BGH NJW 1986 at 2406. See also Broker v Contractor, 
above n 17, which was, nonetheless, set aside in the Swiss courts: Cour de Justice (Court of Appeal), 
Geneva in 1984, and the Tribunal Fédéral (Supreme Court), Geneva in 1990; Omnium de Traitementet de 
Valorisation – OTV (France) v Hilmarton (UK) (1994) 19 YBCA 214. 
63 See for example Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (Germany), above n 59, at §817. 
64 See for example Law on Obligations (Serbia), above n 59, at art 104(2); Civil Code of the Republic of 
Poland, art 412. 
65 In equal fault, better is the condition of the possessor. 
66 For a critique, see Mirko Möller "Leistungskondiktion trotz beiderseitiger Sittenwidrigkeit? – Die 
Einschränkung des" §817 S 2 BGB durch den BGH NJW 2006 at 268. 
67 Meyer, above n 61, at 10. 
68 Case 3913 [1981] Coll Vol 497; Company S v Company F, above n 17. 
69 Johann Graf Lambsdorff "Making corrupt deals: contracting in the shadow of the law" (2002) 48 Journal of 
Economic Behavior & Organization 221. 
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potential participants. Similarly, the possibility of getting nothing and picking up the bill for the 
other party serves as a potential deterrent for those who plan to engage in bribery.  
The other contract that might actually be at stake before the tribunal is the one allegedly 
procured by bribery. Namely, the subject-matter of the arbitration might be the contract not between 
the principal and the intermediary, but between the successful principal and the target of that 
principal's bribery operation. The target company might allege that the contract concluded between 
the parties has been procured because its officers were bribed and it is thus tainted. But what follows 
from such "taintedness", if the applicable law indeed labels the disputed conduct as "bribery"? The 
answer depends on whether one views the existence of the procured contract as primarily the 
infringement of the public interest, or the interest of the private actors. 
One option would be to apply the same yardstick, and to treat contracts procured by bribery just 
like the contracts aimed at bribery – null and void ex lege. A possible justification for this position 
would be that the anti-corruption policy does not serve to protect the parties to the dispute, but 
rather the citizens and consumers who will eventually foot the corruption bill through paying higher 
prices and taxes. It appears that this zero-tolerance approach is regarded by some as a transnational 
principle.70 However, there is "no transnational consensus" that ipso iure and ab initio invalidity of 
the contracts procured by bribery represents a shared transnational legal and moral value.71 
This solution (null and void ex lege) would be far from adequate and would sacrifice the 
legitimate interests of innocent parties at the altar of the abstract notion of public interest. That is 
why contracts procured by bribery are usually treated as voidable: because of the lack of valid 
consent, for example, through deceit or excess of authority.72 Proving requirements under any of the 
two may vary considerably from one national law to another.73 In practice, the fallout of such 
avoidance will sometimes be very difficult to carry out, especially in complex and long-term 
  
70 See for example Centre of Transnational Law, above n 61: 
Contracts based on or involving the payment or transfer of bribes ("corruption money", "secret 
commissions", "pots-de-vin", "kickbacks") are void (emphasis added). 
71 See Raeschke-Kessler and Gottwald in Muchlinski, Ortino and Schreuer, above n 3, at 595. 
72 Council of Europe Civil Law Convention on Corruption, above n 60, at art 8(2), reads: 
Each Party shall provide in its internal law for the possibility for all parties to a contract whose 
consent has been undermined by an act of corruption to be able to apply to the court for the 
contract to be declared void, notwithstanding their right to claim for damages. 
See also International Institute for the Unification of Private Law UNIDROIT Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts 2010 (Rome, 2010) at art 3.1.1, Illustration 16. Sometimes, this possibility is 
provided for interested third parties. See Meyer, above n 61, at 12 for further references; Raeschke-Kessler 
and Gottwald in Muchlinski, Ortino and Schreuer, above n 3, at 595. 
73 Compare national reports in Olaf Meyer (ed) The Civil Law Consequences of Corruption (Nomos, Baden-
Baden, 2009): Olaf Meyer, at 156 (Germany); C Takoff, at 203 (Bulgaria); D Kraft, at 209 (England). 
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contracts that have been partially performed. Where the restitutio in naturam is impossible, the 
briber should be compensated only for his or her expenses, and not for the full market value of his 
or her performance. Awarding a briber full market value would allow them to actually profit from 
their corrupt dealings.74 
Finally, it might be observed that, faced with different choice-of-law approaches with respect to 
the issue of bribery, the tribunal might be tempted to eventually use the one that will tap into the 
body of rules (national or perceived transnational) that bring it to the desired solution on the merits. 
Taking the "transnational route" might be tempting, but is increasingly difficult to defend or justify 
the further one gets from simply observing the illegality of public bribery. Application of national 
laws – be it pursuant to the traditional conflict analysis, voie directe, or other method – remains a 
more reliable solution.  
VII JUDICIAL SCRUTINY OF THE RESULTING AWARDS 
Allegations of corrupt practice, bribery especially, will not easily succeed before an arbitral 
tribunal. They might fail at the level of choice-of-law (applicable law does not incriminate a 
particular type of agreement or conduct) or might simply fail to be proven (since the burden of proof 
of criminal matters in arbitration is often set rather high).75 If the defence succeeds and the claim 
(for example, an intermediary's claim for "commission") is rejected, unsuccessful claimants' chances 
for reversing the decision in most jurisdictions will be close to zero. Even if the tribunal has erred on 
the side of caution and saw bribery where there was none, the Model Law76 (and its progeny) and 
the New York Convention77 offer no foothold for review of the merits, except when it comes to 
breaches of public policy. 
If the defence fails, the only chance for the unsuccessful party would lie in invoking public 
policy grounds for setting aside the award78 or refusing its recognition and enforcement.79 Since this 
is the ground to be examined ex officio, invoking it is, strictly speaking, not necessary, but will 
  
74 See Cameroon Airlines v Transnet Ltd [2004] EWHC 1829 (CA). 
75 Alternatives do exist, such as reversal of the burden of proof. For the most recent and comprehensive 
overview of the matter, see Wilske and Fox in Kröll and others, above n 20, at 489–505. See also Hwang 
and Lim, above n 2, at 14–25. 
76 Model Law, above n 26. 
77 New York Convention, above n 25. 
78 See for example Model Law, above n 26, at art 34(2)(b)(i); Swiss Federal Code on Private International 
Law, above n 42, at art 190(1)(e); French Decree No 2011-48 of 13 January 2011, reforming the law 
governing arbitration, art 1492(5); German Act on the Reform of the Law relating to Arbitral Proceedings 
1998, s 1059. 
79 See for example New York Convention, above n 25, at art 5(2)(b); Arbitration Act 1996 (UK), above n 44, 
at s 81(c); French Decree No 2011-48, ibid, at art 1488. 
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normally be done together with the presentation of the relevant facts. The weakness of the public 
policy defence and the general distaste for its application in the field of international commercial 
arbitration is well documented.80 However, prohibition of bribery certainly falls within the domain 
of public policy. Courts deciding on the setting aside will examine the award in light of the 
international public policy of the forum.81 Courts approached for recognition will examine whether 
the enforcement of such an award will run contrary to the international public policy of the country 
of recognition.82 Therefore, although it is relatively easy to accept the proposition that public 
bribery is contrary to every domestic, international and transnational public policy, and that 
enforcement of the award that puts a stamp of approval on such a transaction is contrary to public 
policy,83 other types of conduct may fail to clear the threshold of public policy in some 
jurisdictions. In other words, in matters other than bribery of the public official, successful use of 
the public policy ground will depend on the severity and comprehensiveness of the local legislation. 
The impact and reach of the public policy ground for annulment or refusal of recognition will vary 
accordingly. 
Invoking public policy imports other dilemmas. Although courts will normally not examine the 
merits of the award, public policy considerations may alter this attitude. Public policy issues are 
  
80 As summarised in Judge Borrough's famous remark, public policy is "never argued at all but when other 
points fail": Richardson v Mellish (1824) 2 Bing 229 at 252, 130 ER 294 (Comm Pleas) at 303. See for 
example Marie Louise Seelig "The Notion of Transnational Public Policy and its Impact on Jurisdiction, 
Arbitrability and Admissibility" (2009) 57 Annals of the University of Belgrade Faculty of Law 116; Lalive, 
above n 54, at 258 et seq; RH Kreindler "Approaches to the Application of Transnational Public Policy by 
Arbitrators" (2003) 4 Journal of World Investment 239; and Audley Sheppard "Public Policy and the 
Enforcement of Arbitral Awards: Should there be a Global Standard?" (2004) 1 Transnational Dispute 
Management 5. 
81 Jean Francois Poudret and Sébastien Besson Comparative Law of International Arbitration (Sweet & 
Maxwell, London, 2007) at 763–765; James D Fry "Désordre Public International under the New York 
Convention: Wither Truly International Public Policy" (2009) 8 Chinese JIL 81 at 86 et seq; Algerian Code 
of Civil Procedure, art 458 bis 17, as amended; Lebanese Code of Civil Procedure, arts 814 and 817(5); Law 
No 1879/02 on Arbitration and Mediation 2002 (Paraguay), art 46(b); and Legislative Decree No 1071 
Regulating Arbitration (Peru), art 63(1)(f). 
82 BGH, IPRax 2000 at 580; Slovenian Manufacturer v German Exclusive Distributor (1999) 29 YBCA 687 at 
686 and 696; OLG Schleswig, RIW 2000, 30 March 2000 at 705; OLG Bremen, BB 2000, 30 September 
1999, Appendix 12 at 18; decision of the Cour d'Appel de Beyrouth of 21 February 2008 [2009] J Arab 
Arbitration 310 at 314. 
83 The International Law Association Committee on International Commercial Arbitration's Interim Report on 
Public Policy as a Bar to Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards (2000) at 22, states that "it is 
arguable that there is an international consensus that corruption and bribery are contrary to international 
public policy". On some occasions, however, the courts were careful to assign a lover level in the "scale of 
opprobrium" than, for example, drug trafficking, eventually leaving the award intact: see Westacre 
Investments Inc v Jugoimport-SPDR Holding Co Ltd [1998] 3 WLR 770 (QB) at 798–800. There was a 
similar result in R v V [2008] EWHC 1531 (QB). 
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woven into the award. Deciding on whether the tribunal has actually endorsed bribery might require 
examination of how the award was made and what its "ingredients" were. How intrusive may this 
review turn out to be? The answer is not uniform. 
In the face of corruption allegations, some courts have continued to value finality of the award 
and have deferred (to a great extent) to legal and factual findings made by tribunals. For instance, 
one court held that erroneous application of the criminal law standard would not be examined,84 
while the other maintained that it would not re-examine a tribunal's decision not to apply prohibition 
of intermediaries of loci solutionis.85 Other courts have employed a completely different approach, 
opening a de novo review of factual and legal findings (wrong assessment of evidence, non-
application or erroneous application of law, and so on).86 Some courts tried to identify the trigger 
that would justify abandonment of deference and application of a higher standard of review: ranging 
from a circular argument that there should first be a "blatant, actual and concrete" breach of 
international public policy,87 to a multi-stage test, whereby further inquiry is conditional upon 
finding that there is "prima facie evidence" from one side that the award is based on an illegal 
contract, and that further examination is justified.88 The latter approach has been endorsed by 
authors such as Michael Hwang and Kevin Lim, who argue that the initial, prima facie, filter should 
also encompass assessment of the nature of the alleged illegality.89 It is fair to conclude that the 
approach of the courts on this matter will continue to be anything but uniform. Complete deference 
seems to be an ill-suited protector of public policy principles, and it is understandable why courts 
and arbitrators attempt to devise a test ("trigger") for further inquiry. It is also notable that the 
approach of complete deference to the findings of the arbitrators requires parties to furnish fresh, 
new evidence of illegality. This will be available only in the rarest of circumstances. 
Although the bribery defence "card" will most likely be played as early as possible, it is 
conceivable that it could be used for the first time in the annulment/recognition proceedings for 
tactical reasons. Normally, the parties to the arbitration can later invoke a defect only if they have 
objected to it in a timely manner. However, it could be argued that this principle should not be 
automatically applicable in the context of deficiencies that are examined ex officio. In other words, 
if the award is challenged for effectively upholding bribery, the facts upon which the challenge is 
  
84 Judgment of the Swiss Federal Tribunal of 28 January 1997 (1998) 16 ASA Bulletin 118. 
85 Northorp Corporation v Triad Financial Establishment 593 F Supp 928 (CD Cal 1984). 
86 See for example European Gas Turbines SA (France) v Westman International Ltd (UK) (1993) 20 YBCA 
198. 
87 See for example Moreau v Verhoef (Final Decision) (2001) 4 Rev Arb 805. 
88 See Soleimany v Soleimany [1998] 3 WLR 811. 
89 Hwang and Lim, above n 2, at 14–25. 
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based need not be fresh or new to the party invoking them, nor would it be required that they have 
already been examined by the tribunal.90 
VIII CONCLUDING REMARKS 
While it is tempting to automatically label the fight against "corruption and bribery" as a matter 
of public policy, a more detailed examination reveals that there are still considerable differences 
between jurisdictions when it comes to how "bribery" is defined. There is a strong consensus only 
when it comes to the core of that notion (the bribery of public officials). 
In any event, legislation against bribery reopens – in the context of international commercial 
arbitration – a relatively familiar set of issues relating to the application of overriding mandatory 
provisions and the ambit and operation of the various shades of "ordre public". What differs from 
the standard fare of mandatory rules is, however, the intensity of potential infringement of 
considerations of public policy. Potentially strong public policy concerns influence not only the 
methodology of determining applicable rules (where departure from party autonomy will often be 
necessary), but also touch upon the role of the arbitrators and their relationship vis-à-vis judicial 
machinery. Any specific legislative duty to report illegality will trump an implied (and express) duty 
of confidentiality, provided that its scope of application (personal and territorial) reaches the 
arbitrators. Moral imperative alone is unlikely to have the same effect on an arbitrator's decision to 
report or not report. 
Public policy considerations also influence substantive reactions towards the finding of 
illegality. Some of these considerations appear lopsided (for example, the no restitution rule), but 
they nevertheless serve a wider policy goal which might not be apparent in the context of a single 
case. Nuances of civil law consequences across jurisdictions also invoke caution against the 
overzealous invocation of transnational ordre public when it comes to findings of illegality, since it 
is difficult to identify "transnational" principles that would logically be applied to compliment the 
initial finding and determine the civil law consequences of a finding of bribery. 
Finally, the courts stand as the final guardians of public policy, including the public policy 
against bribery and corruption in general. While arbitral tribunals can draw on a wider choice of 
potentially applicable rules (overriding mandatory rules in particular), national courts cannot go 
further than protecting the limited turf of the international public policy of that forum. In doing so, 
the courts have to solve the difficult issue of balancing the cardinal principle of the finality of 
arbitral awards with the imperative of safeguarding public policy. Not surprisingly, no ready 
  
90 A similar distinction is also made in the Swiss Federal Tribunal Law, art 123, albeit in a different context of 
revision of the award: crime and felony warrant revision irrespective of the novelty and freshness of the 
facts. For a similar line of argumentation, see the dissenting opinion of Waller LJ in Westacre Investments 
Inc v Jugoimport-SDRP Holding Co Ltd [1999] 3 WLR 811 (CA) at 833 et seq.  
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formula for achieving this balance has emerged until now, but it appears that outright deference to 
the findings of the tribunal is particularly unsuitable. 
